THE CURRENT CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION
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t is not easy to talk about the current situation in legal education without being misunderstood. The dominant methods in luse are a number of variations of case teaching, the whole range of these variations being commonly lumped together under the single misleading label, "The
Case System"; and the question of what needs doing more frequently
than not takes the form of whether "the case system" is or is not "sound"
or "satisfactory" or "adequate"-which is much like asking whether eating is the road to the Good Life. In the one case, as in the other, there
seems as yet no way to the goal which does not utilize the particular
means under discussion; but both "eating" and "case teaching" are terms
too broad to .carry any clear meaning, and each is a line of practice which,
though .of high utility, is frequently abused, misconceived, and turned
to uses for which it is not essentially designed; and, finally, neither appears to be in itself adequate even to approach the total goal desired.
IPerhaps the best way to begin is to describe case teaching. Its essence lies in the provision to all students in a class of a series of con,crete, problem-raising situations-common material for group discussion, so selected and arranged that related problems can be considered
together in an effort to develop principles in the course of class discussion, and to provide some exercise, in class, in the testing and application
,of the principles. I hardly need say that unless such principles are clear
.arid articulate (at need) to the instructor before the case-class begins,
the class becomes not teaching, but hit-or-miss experiment.
The values of this type of approach to any technical study are obvi,ous. The concrete situation stimulates attention and gives both the individual student and the class at large something to get teeth into as
well as something which makes discussion meaningful and relatively
easy to remember. Broad words and ideas are sharpened against hard,
clean situations. The body of common material, studied in advance by
the entire class and presented during the discussion for detailed study,
permits valuable training in analysis and diagnosis and in the rigorous
thinking-through of the relation of any proposed "line" of solution to its
;application. Not the least fertile aspect is the possibility of having
something in the nature of a real discussion class which can enlist active participation from many, and also silent participation of a whole
:group ranging up to two hundred or more.
*
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However, there have crept into current law teaching accidental features which threaten to obscure or even defeat the values available under
the general method:
1. The "cases" used are commonly reproductions, more or less complete, from the official reports of appellate judicial decisions-so much
so that when any other type of material is used it has come to receive a
different name: "problem," or "material," rather than "case." The first
limitation imposed by this practice is that the court's more or less authoritative answer is provided, in advance, along with the problem presented for study.
2. From the first difficulty flows the second, familiar to every teacher
in law or out: to wit, that when students are provided with a set of answers, the job of getting them to focus attention on the techniques of
solution, rather than on the answers, is difficult.
3. This evil is reinforced by the fact that law teachers themselves
have fallen into a general practice of seeing the vital lines of organization of a course (and hence also of the cases to be chosen and arranged)
as consisting rather of "subject matter" than of the skills of the lawyer;
as consisting of bodies of rules of law to be extracted, arranged, and
learned rather than as a body of principles (or even rules) of the legal
crafts which have to be studied both in theory and in practice in order to
develop an adequate craftsman.
It is obvious that when the answers are provided in the materials and
are also made the basis of organization, the basis of labeling the course,
and the most heavily stressed portion of the examination, the possibilities of case teaching are jeopardized and can even be defeated. But
plainly this does not apply to the method as such, but only to its misconception or abuse.
Accepted classroom practice runs in terms of a number of familiar
devices. The first-calling on a student for the "statement of the case"
-is primarily directed at substituting a lawyer's (or scientist's) accurate
and intensive reading of material for the typical layman's newspaperheadline style of dealing with the printed word. At the same time it
seeks to develop the student's power to analyze, compress, arrange, and
reduce ideas to accurate expression; and also to develop a skill of special
technical legal interest: the ability to distinguish a court's "authoritative
holding" from legally less important language in the opinion and even
from the court's effort to decide some point which is not strictly "in the
case."
Another standard class technique is the testing of any student's formulation of a rule or principle (or, indeed, of policy) by a series of hypothetical cases which push the proposed formulation further and further
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out to the borderlines of application, so as ultimately to reduce any overformulation to a partial absurdity which shows on its face its own need
of correction. Such hypotheticals can either be invented, and so make
their appeal to common-sense judgment, or they can be derived from
other decisions, so that their appeal becomes one also to accepted authority.
But the range of approach in individual use of these and other accepted techniques is immense. Perhaps the two most striking lines of
variation are what may be called approaching the case from the front, on
the one hand, and approaching it, on the other hand, from the rear.
The latter approach takes the decision primarily as a something done
and complete, a something which provides an authoritative datum about
the state of the law, a something to be tested, therefore, for how far it
reaches, how solidly it may be expected to stand up under later events,
and--on a sharply different level-for how wise it is or how it fits together with other decisions or principles of law.
This line is obviously related to the "answer" and the "subject-matter"
approach to the material. It is at the present time altogether too widespread. It is an approach which had great utility in the early case-system
days, when great bodies of our fundamental law were still in relatively
unorganized form; an approach which still displays value in those fieldsof law which are still growing and relatively amorphous today; in addition, at least one sound, clean, semester-long job along these lines is
worth a student's time in order to put him through the process which
leads to developing any picture of the organization of rules of law on a
larger scale of synthesis. For that, too, is among the craft skills which
a lawyer must mster as he moves in life into any field of interest in
which the law is in rapid movement. Yet I insist that even when that
skill is intended to be a central value of a course, the skill as such will
be absorbed by the bulk of the students only if the skill is made explicitly,
sustainedly, insistently the focus of organization and of class treatment.
It is too complex a job to become an incidental by-product for any but
the

aifted.

The contrasting, less frequent, and more vital approach "from the
front" is an approach to the case as a problem for solution, not as a
problem already solved. Its essence lies in such questions as: What materials were there to work with, .before the decision and in the decision?
How could the case, or the materials at hand, have been analyzed, presented, and argued to give cogent reason for deciding for the losing
party? How did the winning party arrange his case to win? Or did
the court decide for the winner in spite of his blobs in presentation and
argument, and, if so, how and why?
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In a word, the problem is presented as one for solution, as a problem
not with its answer at hand but as one to which possible answers are to
be worked out in class. The court's actual answer could, except so far
.as it indicates the prior materials available for use, be omitted from the
decision entirely so far as this training aspect is concerned, save that
that decision provides one important datum on questions which concern every lawyer: to wit, what kinds of men and minds sit on the bench,
what appeals to them, how do they think, and how do they decide in
fact?
In this aspect, every case worked over becomes a direct exercise in
living law and in dealing with an essential problem which the prospective lawyer will face in his life work-the persuasion of a court to reach
the desired answer in a new case as yet undecided.
Either of these lines of approach throws off by-products of analysis,
of training in orderly thought, and to some extent in argument. But it
is obvious that where the principles around which the discussion revolves are principles of law, then the principles of effective craftwork
must come in for less conscious attention and for much less adequate
development. Indeed, as case teaching has moved into these later days,
and the fact situations considered and their implications of policy have
become increasingly complex, some of the old-time virtue is lost when
the "case" is made up solely of a judicial decision, and especially when
that decision is "edited down" into greater "simplicity." For discussion
in class which has to rest upon horse-sense judgments of policy loses its
bite when the facts are not themselves sufficiently understood in their
background and weight to render the students' untutored horse sense
sufficient to ground an answer. And with the increasing pressure to
"cover ground" .in regard to rules and principles of law, discussion tends
to shoal off. The basic virtues of the method cease to be achieved with
any reliability throughoutthe class.
But reliability of the effective results of teaching, spread down to
every single graduate, is the essence of reliable professional training. To
me it seems clear that what is called for in this aspect, in order to recapture the ancient virtues of case teaching, is a great intensification of
the problem discussions: the provision of much more background of
fact and policy in regard to any problem or set of problems, a vastly
more sustained discussion of details more fully presented and more
clearly seen-in a word, the stepping up of this basic and vital method
until it does take hold of every student; a stepping up, though at the
price of reduction of the number of problem situations dealt with in
any "course" down to a third or a tenth.
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This leads into the next problem one faces in all professional training,
but one from which the law curriculum, with the modern expansion of
government, perhaps suffers more than most: the hugely gro~ving quantity of information about subject matter which is needed for competence in the discipline. The pressure to expand the amount of "just
plain law" "covered in class" has of course greatly increased the tendency in case teaching to concentrate upon subject matter at the expense
of training in craft-skills. Nor could anything be a less happy development. For it is obvious that man could hardly devise a more
wasteful method of imparting information about subject matter than
the case-class. Certainly man never has. We face a crisis when we
find the curriculum being drowned in an unthinking effort to use such a
method as the sole means, or the main means, for accomplishing an end
so vital.
For information, as such, can be packed into books. Its acquisition
can be guided by syllabus and lecture. That is what books, syllabus,
and lecture are for, whereas the case class is a class in doing-though
the doing be mental and verbal; it is a cooperative, supervised, systematic exercise in diagnosis of a problem; in organization of data; in the
arts of reaching for, building, and testing solutions or arguments, of
making reasoned judgments of policy and putting them to the test; an
exercise in the craft-skill-and the human skill-of accurate, orderly,
persuasive formulation in language of thoughts that need such organization and expression in order to accomplish a given purpose.
Now, case teaching has shown that such exercise can profitably be
carried on in large groups working on common material; whereas the
basic acquisition of information is best accomplished man by man, as
each man reads by himself. Indeed, one can go further: the case system can be directly vicious on the point of acquiring needed information about the state of the rules of law, because the effect over three
years of limiting a student's required reading substantially to fifteen
or so pages a day, conveniently collected in a single book (or spotted
by the instructor without need for student research), is to discourage that
very habit and skill of independent outside reading and searching which
is one major part of every professional man's equipment.
Again be it noted that I address myself to the abuse of the method,
not to what is inherent in it. Consider, for example, the possibility of
building up our so-called cases out beyond the judicial opinion into
something resembling the completeness of the cases gathered for the
Harvard Business School. Consider the elimination from the center of
a case-course of the present emphasis on "covering subject matter" in
class, with that prbblem relegated to the outside reading of the student.
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Consider the supplementation of the case-class by other types of course
such as those I shall shortly mention. Given these things, the evil referred to vould simply disappear.
There is an increasing body of opinion in the law schools to the effect
that if the various legal craft-skills now inculcated by indirection in the
first-year case-classes were made the explicit focuts of the first year, we
should be able to bring every student who remains in the school into the
opening of the second year already trained to read judicial decisions
and to use them with some professional competence. We all find that
this is accomplished among our best students, and the body of opinion
referred to leans to the view that the failure to do so for the bulk of students rests on the shift of emphasis in the first-year courses, over the
past half-century, to "subject matter."
In any event, three things are obvious. The first is that the skills
properly to be derived from case teaching are essential to every lawyer.
The second is that the handling of all or the bulk of the inculcation
of the rules of law by way of the case-class (which comes, before the
third year, to deaden students' interest as much as in the first semester
it stimulated that interest) is so costly in time as to make the amount of
information acquired about the more important or typical fields of law
definitely inadequate for any graduate. The third thing is that along
with the so-called "case skills" there are many other craft-skills of the
lawyer which the schools can and should impart both in theory and in
practice.
Indeed, one of the most satisfactory educational tools in existence is
the machinery of the 'student-run law reviews, under which the better
men are drained off case-class work into jobs of research, synthesis,
criticism, and expression, and are given training which surpasses in adequacy that accomplished by their faculty in the classroom. The studentrun law review is a unique American achievement which I wish I had
time to describe; here is the only known group of first-rate professional
periodicals responsibility edited and partly written by undergraduatesin
the discipline. The importance of those reviews here lies in the fact that
they are themselves also educational machinery with cleanly developed
techniques for rapid and amazingly effective training, machinery recognized by faculties as having peculiar value in supplementation of the
standard curriculum. The second importance here of the reviews lies
in the fact that they are, under present organization, available only to
a small portion of the student body; and that the implications of that
fact lie largely unnoticed: to wit, that the law degree does not yet certify
professional competence, and that the law curriculum fails to utilize
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known and effective teaching techniques which exist, developed and in
use, in the law schools themselves.
Here and there throughout the country one finds other experiments,
and at times experiments highly successful, in proceeding further along
comparable lines. In some places the moot-court work, in which students get practice in the art of argument-at times even in the art of
presenting cases at trial-has reached not only an effective level but a
range of application that spreads its benefits pretty well throughout the
student body. Here and there one can find effective courses in the interpretation of statutory language, and in its drafting, and in the legislative process, and so on. In the main, however, we find neither advocacy nor the techniques of handling statutes as yet a true part of the
curriculum for all, and the same holds of the arts of simple counseling
and of drafting legal documents such as contracts, pleadings, and wills.
Yet each of these fundamental arts of the legal craft is an art with
principles, well practiced by, and to a lesser extent consciously articulate among, the better lawyers of the country. In those skills, in making
their theory conscious and in giving elementary practice in their use, lies
the first great immediate need and opportunity of legal education today.
And be it observed that the teaching methods required are essentially those offered by case-teaching itself, when rightly understood in
contrast to prevailing misunderstanding. For, as indicated above, it is
not the judicial decision which is the essence of the "case"; it is instead
the concrete problem-raishig situation-so that, as I see it, any introduction of the so-called "problem method" into law teaching is really
but an expansion of the essential merits of case-teaching, an expansion
obscured only by a current mis-emphasis upon the idea of a "case" as
being at best the official report of a judicially decided cause. Certainly
it has been demonstrated that appellate records can become good "cases"
-that appellate advocacy, for instance, can be effectively taught in fairly
large groups with, for example, a set of teams, of four each, at work
preparing the arguments on each side of the issue. There I speak from
personal experience. Under such a regime one major by-product is the
learning of teamwork; and the fact that there are four, or six, or even
eight teams at work on a given side does not at all detract from the effectiveness of discussion and criticism before and by the whole class of
one or two briefs taken as samples, using them as a basis for developing

the relevant craft-principles and for testing and applying them. The
critique which derives from those teams whose briefs are not the subject of the detailed discussion is informed, embattled, and in turn informative to others. As in any proper case-class, there is before the
group a common body of basic problem-material. What is under study
1
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is the possibility which it offers for learning and practicing how to operate and how to organize insight and judgment. As in any proper
case-class, concrete variations of possible solutions of a concrete problem
offer the wherewithal not only to develop explicit principle, but to give
to principle a living meaning-and to check up on inadequate formulation.
It has been demonstrated also that particular areas of law and administration can serve very satisfactorily as the vehicles for exercise in such
matters as negotiation, or presentation of cases before an arbitrator or
an administrative official, and that the division of a class (either permanently, or in rotation; either by option or assignment) into agency-staff
and citizen interest (or, as the case may be, agency-staff, labor, and
employer interest, etc.) is an effective means not only of stimulating interest and work and of developing personal skills, but also of
deepening and rounding out insight into the legal and policy problems
concerned in the broader background of the concrete situation in hand.
What has not been done as yet on any important scale at any individual law school is to range through the whole field of such possibilities and
seek to set up, within the available time, a reasonably rounded, reasonably reliable body of training for a whole student body. That is, as the
question of social responsibility raises its head, a sustained effort to make
the law school's law degree become a reliable mint-mark. Nor has there
as yet been any large-scale attention to provision of the kind of legal
text which is needed in order, not to supplement a case-course in a given
subject matter, but to substitute for one.
I have been thus far so occupied with the need for teaching handsand-feet that I have used up time which should, perhaps, have been devoted to a larger and no less necessary purpose. I reject entirely the suggestion made earlier in this conference that concepts like Good and Just
should be spelt with lower-case initials.' I reject the general and explicit acceptance of such an idea in our discussion since. To me, my
brother who suggested lower-case spelling of the essential goals, and
upper-case spelling of Science, has his good idea only partly by the tail.
He wants no Authority to tell him what the Goals must be. le knows
also that an Authority can be mistaken. He rejects the idea that any
Authority is entitled to prescribe any particular Goal.
I cannot quarrel with him about any Authority's dictating any particular goal. But I quarrel hard with any implication he may suggest
that there are not, to quest for, Goals worth putting into upper-case. I
cannot define them, I know nobody who can. But the Quest after them
IThe reference is to the address by Dr. Homer W. Smith, of the New York University College of Medicine, on "Objectives and Objectivity in Science."-Ed.

1 JOUnuIAL OF LEGAL ED.No.2

1948]

EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

219

is worth upper-case-a Quest for each of us, and a Quest for our legal
system. In my brother Michael's phrase: a quest for The Good Life,
for All-of-us.
What I say in what follows is to be read in these terms.
Apart from widening the field of information obtained and developing the practice of independent reading, and apart from the introduction into the curriculum of training in the theory and application of the
craft-skills, there remains as a largely neglected feature in the present
curriculum the job which has occupied so much attention in this conference: for us, the job of providing the lawyer with some understanding of his public responsibility and with sufficient vision both to get perspective on his life work and to guide his professional judgments-to
guide his judgments not only as a craftsman of the profession but also
as a citizen whose work is peculiarly centered on the problems of government.
Partly this need is being met by increasing stress in the curriculum on
areas of so-called "public law" in which the larger interests of the community and the conflicts of policy within it come in for more emphasis
than in the traditional "private-law" branches such as Contracts and
Property. Partly the need is being palliated by overt recognition that
even "private" law is shot through with problems of general welfare.
"Property," for instance, concerns housing and city planning, concerns
taxation policy as well as estate planning, estate planning as well as rules
about rights of way or the recording of deeds. But in both aspects the
continued use of the case-class as a vehicle to purvey information comes
at a prohibitive cost in time.
Meanwhile, the tradition of Anglo-American law teaching has run
in terms of intense specialization on relatively narrow areas. That is
one difficulty. It limits the outlook of teacher and scholar. We have
not, for example, had any good survey of the whole picture of our law
since Holmes, in the Seventies, partly modernized Kent's imitation of
Blackstone. The other difficulty is that policy, when seen in the large, is
almost impossible to divorce from politics, and that the tradition of our
schools has been a non-political tradition. Faculty and students join
in frowning on an instructor's taking, in class, a "preaching" or "political" position. For instance, my own use of the TVA last semester (in
Jurisprudence) as an illustration of a vital new approach to problems of
governmental organization affronted a number of otherwise interested
and sympathetic students. "This goes outside the limits of academic
freedom !"
These facts explain-but they neither excuse nor cure-this other
major gap in legal training. Let me say only, in the little time I have
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left, that I think that the art of making reasonably sound decisions on
policy is as communicable as any other skill of the legal craft, and that
I believe techniques for giving some reasonable training in it not only
can be made available, but are available already. And, secondly, that
the development of a whole view of the law and of what law is for is a
duty, however partial its performance may prove. It stands as a problem on much the same basis as that which the country faced after the
Civil War in regard to the resumption of specie payments. There had
been specie payments once; it was urged that they had since become impossible. So here, there was once a time when the seeing of the law
whole, in terms of purpose, functioning, evaluation, was the essence of
law teaching. "Philosophy," which meant an effort to see and impart
whole-meaning, was in the saddle. Let it not be urged that we cannot recapture that ideal-in-action, and inform it also with some reasonable sense
of balance appropriate to the common-law tradition, and with concrete
training in the hands-and-feet of effective method for accomplishing
ideals, merely because such a conjunction looks at the moment "impossible." For we have hardly begun to restudy what can be done with
three years of time, or with effort at wider vision. Again, as in that
older crisis, the sound slogan is: "The way to resume is to resume 1"

